Does Colorado Have a Republican Form of Government?

At the Excess of Democracy blog, Derek Muller (Pepperdine Law) has an interesting post on Kerr v. Hickenlooper, the case claiming that Colorado lacks a republican form of government, as required by Article 4, Section 4 (the guarantee clause).  As he explains:

In 1992, Colorado voters, by initiative, enacted a “Taxpayer Bill of Rights” (TABOR) that prohibits the legislature from raising tax rates or imposing new taxes without voter approval. Plaintiffs recently sued and claimed that the legislature had a kind of inherent right as a republican form of government to control tax increases.

The district court rejected defendant’s argument (at least as an initial matter) that claims under the guarantee clause are non-justiciable.  The Tenth Circuit heard oral argument last Monday.

Professor Muller thinks that the case is a non-justiciable political question.  I agree, but on somewhat different grounds.  He argues:

The second prong [of Baker v. Carr, a key political question precedent] … is salient: “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.” Defining a “Republican Form of Government” is not an easy task, and certainly not one the judiciary has undertaken in over 200 years.

Further, the narrowness of the question weighs against examining the definition. The defendants who appealed note in their briefs that there are limited sit[u]ations in which it might be justiciable–such as if a state instituted a tyranny or a monarchy. But here, the question is whether the legislature has a right to raise taxes absent the popular vote of the people-and, perhaps as a prior question, whether the people can remove a delegated task of certain kinds of taxation from their representatives by initiative and restore it to themselves.

I disagree.  The fact that a question is hard should not make it non-justiciable.  Muller quotes a law professors’ amicus brief (written by some people with whom I often don’t agree, including Erwin Chemerinsky):

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William Jacobson on Natural Born Citizens

From earlier this month, William A. Jacobson (Legal Insurrection) has this impressive post — actually a long scholarly essay — on the eligibility clause: natural born Citizens: Marco Rubio, Bobby Jindal, Ted Cruz.  Short version: he thinks there is not a clear case for ineligibility of any of the three.  (Quite an impressive set of comments too, although the vitriol runs pretty high).

My thoughts are here (regarding Cruz).

As to Jindal and Rubio, I think there is no substantial textualist/originalist argument against their eligibility, as they were both both in the United States (although to non-citizen parents).  Whatever else it did, English law considered a “natural born subject” to be anyone (other than the child of a foreign ambassador or invader) born within English territory, without regard to the citizenship of the parents.  Absent evidence to the contrary, it seems appropriate to read the constitutional language in light of its English predecessor. 

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David Barron and Martin Lederman on Congress’ Power to Limit War

In my post on Congress’ power to declare a limited war, I noted that the leading scholarship in support of Congress’ power is by Saikrishna Prakash (here).  I should also have added as well the outstanding two-part article “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb” by David Barron and Martin Lederman in the Harvard Law…

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Congress’ Power to Authorize Limited Hostilities

Does Congress have constitutional power to authorize limited strikes on Syria?  In his otherwise outstanding post on Congress’ war powers, Michael Stokes Paulsen suggests that the answer might be no:

… [I]t is fruitless, and equally unconstitutional, for Congress to authorize the use of force but attempt to micro-manage how it is to be used (as some versions of the proposed resolution now being debated would do). As noted, the conduct of war, once authorized, lies in the hands of the president. Congress has the power to declare war, and the president does not. But the president has the power to conduct war as Commander in Chief—and Congress does not.

I’m not sure which versions of the resolution are meant here, but the principal proposal — (a) limiting the use of force to degrading Syria’s chemical weapons capacity, and (b) limiting the use of force to air power — seems well within Congress’ power to declare a limited war.

The leading article on this subject is by Saikrishna Prakash in the Texas Law Review: The Separation and Overlap of Military Powers.  From the abstract:

Absent from war-powers scholarship is an account of when war and military powers separate and when they overlap. Making arguments sounding in text, structure, and history, this Article supplies such a theory. Numerous English statutes and practices help identify the meaning of the Constitution’s war and military powers. Additional insights come from the Revolutionary War and the half-dozen or so wars fought in the three decades after 1789. In those early years, Congress micromanaged military and wartime operations. Presidents (and their advisors) acquiesced to these congressional assertions of power, expressing rather narrow understandings of presidential power over war and military matters. Using early history as a guide, this Article argues that the Constitution grants Congress complete control over all war and military matters. Some authorities, such as the powers to declare war and establish a system of military justice, rest exclusively with Congress. Military authorities not granted exclusively to Congress vest concurrently with the President and Congress, meaning that either can exercise such powers. In this area of overlap, where congressional statutes conflict with executive orders, the former always trump the latter. Tempering Congress’s ability to micromanage military operations are significant institutional and constitutional constraints that typically make it impossible for Congress to move military assets on a far-off battlefield. In sum, the Constitution creates a powerful Commander in Chief who may direct military operations in a host of ways but who nonetheless lacks any exclusive military powers and is thus subject to congressional direction in all war and military matters.

While I would not go quite as far as Professor Prakash (see here), I agree that Congress has substantial ability to set the goals and limits of the use of force in connection with an authorization of war. 

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Another Notable Amicus Brief in Bond v. United States

In noting the principal amicus briefs in Bond v. United States, I overlooked this one on behalf of Chemical Weapons Convention Negotiators and Experts. As described in this news release from Indiana University: In the brief, the arms control experts support the U.S. government’s position that, properly interpreted, the treaty requires states parties, including the United States, to apply its prohibitions on…

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The Fallacies of Marshallian Nationalism

At Law and Liberty, Adam Tate: The Fallacies of Marshallian Nationalism (reviewing The Fallacies of States’ Rights by Sotirios A. Barber (Harvard University Press 2013)).  From the introduction:

In this spirited polemic, Prof. Sotirios Barber defends the American nationalist constitutional
tradition, particularly the thought of John Marshall, from the attacks of both states’ rights advocates (who he calls “dual federalists) and process federalists, those who believe national power should be used in expansive ways to protect individual rights without working to establish one specific American society.

Barber uses Marshall’s 1819 decision in McCulloch v. Maryland as the starting point for nationalist analysis. Hence, he mentions only briefly the important clashes between nationalists and their opponents during the first three decades of the Early Republic. In explaining the rationale behind what he calls “Marshallian federalism” Barber is at his best. Marshall advocated an “ends-oriented constitutionalism.” (16) He believed that the US government was limited in the sense that the government was confined to seek the ends set forth in the Constitution. Marshall’s “positive understanding” (32) of government power sought to help secure the people’s happiness and to instruct them as to their “true interests.” (19) Marshall defended “implied national powers, liberal construction of national power, and national legislative supremacy.” (52) In the midst of this celebration of expansive power, Barber admits, “Under the right circumstances, any and every area of social life could become subjects of concern to policy makers working for ends like national security and prosperity.” (44) Barber then scales back this claim by insisting that Marshallian federalism includes a “rule against pretexts,” meaning that Congress could not pass laws “whose actual motivating purpose is different from its stated purpose.” (68-69) This would guarantee limited “in the sense of properly motivated” government. Barber clearly identifies the presuppositions of “Marshallian federalism”: “a national community that predates the Constitution,” the responsibility of “the national government… for facilitation or securing” the “community’s controlling values,” and the denial that “individual states can lawfully avoid the burdens of pursuing these values.” (50) Nationalism presupposes a certain kind of American society – a Lockean liberal society (65) – and uses the power of the federal government to enforce it. Barber holds that the ends of Marshall’s nationalism “include national security, national prosperity, equal opportunity, and a secular and rationalist political culture.” (51) He mentions later that current Marshallian federalists should be motivated “by the values of today’s progressive liberals.” (68)

(It gets substantially more critical as it goes along…)

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